According to several news outlets, at least four hundred people have been detained across Russia, as police continually crash protests and vigils in honour of Vladimir Putin’s number one national enemy. Beyond Russia’s borders, however, hundreds – if not thousands – of people have shown their support and solidarity to the citizens and dissidents who share the same revolt and thirst for democracy as Navalny, regardless of his rather controversial remarks and ideas in the past.

Last Saturday, February 17th, members of the Russian diaspora gathered in front of the Russian Federation Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal, chanting anti-Putin slogans and demanding freedom for their homeland. Organised by the Free Russians Association (ADRL – Associação de Russos Livres), the event featured several speakers, encouraging their compatriots not to give up on their fight against pro-war propaganda and misinformation, and to keep supporting the local Ukrainian community in any possible manner. Many Ukrainian immigrants and refugees were also present at the vigil, mourning alongside their neighbours the infamous death of the man who dared to face and expose the Kremlin’s ruling oligarchy.

Amongst tears, heavy sighs, tight embraces, and prayers, I had the opportunity to talk briefly with some people in the crowd. In a mix of Portuguese, English, and Russian, I came up with two solid conclusions: firstly, in general, the young families from both Russian and Ukrainian diasporas refuse to feed hatred against each other, allowing their children to experience the same bond and brotherhood they had while growing up with their relatives in both countries, decades before the 24th of February 2022; secondly, and most important, the ADRL will persist in its effort to raise awareness of the crimes committed by Putin’s regime within and outside Russia. They shall not stop until the victims of war and political persecution, as well as their families, are served justice, even if – according to the thoughts of a few participants in the vigil – it does not happen during our lifetime.

At a time when law enforcement bodies in Russia harden their stance towards any sign of opposition, and the bombings on Ukrainian soil claim more lives, these demonstrations of unity and solidarity from the communities of both nations are essential. Despite these brutal events, they teach the world that we must take heed of the words of the Kremlin’s number one enemy and “don’t give up”!

The post Tribute to Navalny in the European “Far” West first appeared on IR 101.

Private Military Groups, also known as Private Military Contractors, play an integral part in modern warfare. PMCs gained recent prominence due to the Russian state funded Wagner Group, which mutinied against the Russian state. However, the substantial presence of PMCs in the international arena has been prominent since the end of the Cold War and is more complex and critical for the future of politics.

What are PMCs?

PMCs could be considered mercenaries since they act for private gain (the company’s profit) and are recruited locally or abroad to participate in conflicts (UN General Assembly, 1989, Faite, 2008; McFate, 2019). However, they are not precisely classified as mercenaries but are regarded as civilians, who lose their legal protection if they directly participate in international or non-international conflicts. Many of them were veterans of past wars continuing activities in the military industry, ex-convicts, and foreign fighters (McFate, 2019; Al Jazeera, 2021). In addition to PMC, terms like SMC (Security Military Company) and PMSC (Private military and security companies) are used to describe private firms and contractors that provide various services to the armies, functioning as back up forces, as risk management specialists, as advisors with multifaceted expertise, as protection for specific sites or cargo (McFate, 2019; El Mquirmi, 2022;, TRT World Research Centre, 2023 ). PMCs can provide “commonality, coherency, competency, and a unified command structure” and they are not the typical security firms as they are armed and participate in conflict zones (Fitzimons, 2015; El Mquirmi, 2022).

How Do PMCs function under International Law?

Private Military Contractors depend on the states to hire and utilize them. International Humanitarian Law in many cases does not directly reference PMCs in the UN International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, while the Montreux document on “Good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict” provides the international legal obligations of the military companies as well as the states that contract them, but the text is non- binding. Consequently, the national regulatory framework and national interests is more important to determine the practices of PMCs (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2020; Rodio, 2021; UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries, 2023).

The Strategic Use of PMCs in Military Operations and the International Impact of this Strategy

Blackwater / Academi was a prominent USA backed contractor force in the “War of Terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq, while the British Association of Private Security Companies ensures that there can be cooperation between the UK government and PMCs such as Aegis Defense Services (Duggan, 2023). So, in these cases PMCs serve as mercenaries promoting state interests and thus serving as “proxy military companies” (El Mquirmi, 2022).  Russia implements this strategy, as the state doesn’t legally recognize PMCs but indirectly uses them to intervene in foreign conflicts (Marten, 2019). There are many reasons that lead states to hire PMCs, besides additional support to their armed forces. The training of the latter implies an important government spending as well as time to integrate the recruits, while the enlistment of the PMCs has their payment as the only prerequisite. When referring to UK or US PMCs, they are considered high quality and high expertise companies, while the Russian ones are considered cheaper in comparison to the Western ones (Sukhankin, 2019).

Some Private Contractors have been involved in serious controversies and scandals and have even committed war crimes. Members of the Blackwater private military company proceeded in scandals, with the most prominent being the one in Nisour Square, where 17 Iraqi civilians died and 20 were injured. Blackwater claimed in an unclear way that it was some form of defense against gunmen, while it also kept some cooperative activities with the CIA secret from the Congress (Ten Dam, 2009; Roberts, 2014; Al Marashi, 2023). CACI (California Analysis Center) has been put on trial in the past for their unethical conduct in the Abu Graib prisons in Iraq, a federal case yet to be settled, while the UK based G4S provided illegal security for Israeli settlements and prisons in the Westbank while also being involved in immigrant detention in the UK (The Center for Justice and Accountability, n.d.; Center for Constitutional Rights, 2023; TRT World Research Centre, 2023).

PMCs and UN Peacekeeping

The Russian Wagner Group serve as a PMC closely connected and controlled by the state, funded by it primarily promoting its interests through “shadow” warfare (Marten, 2019; McFate, 2019; Council of the European Union Analysis and Research Team, 2023). has participated in wars in Syria, Libya, Africa, and Ukraine violating international law and killing innocent civilians (Ramani, 2023; Pieper, 2023; Saurer, 2023; Tondo et al, 2022; Wintour, 2022; Townsend, 2022; Marten, 2019).  The case of Wagner showcases the pressure of a non-state actor against the state, attacking foreign minister Shoigu of incompetence, due to the PMCs lack of men and ammunition after the battle in Bakhmut as well as the alleged attack on Wagner members by the military (Murphy, 2023). When Prighozin began his rebellion and advanced to the Kremlin, he gained the support of a percentage of the Russian People (Carll and Park, 2023).  The mutiny, however, ended with the Wagner leader fleeing to Belarus after a brokered deal with the state, was characterized by the US foreign minister A. Blinken as a part of the “cracks of the Russian state”. Wagner, however, after their leader’s death, continue to be proxies of Russia in foreign conflicts, such as Mali, in the unconventional warfare and the war in Ukraine (Pepier, 2023; Lowry, 2023).

PMCs and Military in the Post-Covid Era

In the post Covid Era, the traditional military recruitment of many forms was reduced. Some experts blamed the political aspirations of the to-be recruits, the disbelief in the effectiveness of the army, as well as the belief of inner structural problems in the militaries (Barno and Bensahel, 2023; Spochr, 2023).  It is also important to note that it is believed that other forms of warfare are soon going to become the norm, especially unconventional warfare and even cyberwarfare, in which many PMCs have expertise in. The notion that a low percentage of people are enlisted and that a small amount of the annual GDP is provided for the military also highlights this problem, as the US is considered the strongest nation in military force and the biggest contributor in worldwide military spending (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, n.d.; Global Firepower Index, 2023; Statista, 2022). Some argue that the low interest in the military could lead to the increased enlistment of PMCs, while others already approach foreign fighters (Ruz, 2023). The possible dependence of the state by PMCs could have significant effects if used by the private contractors to their advantage (Al Jazeera, 2021). The further use of the contractors and the lesser use of state militaries could mean the diminishment of state sovereignty as well as the sense of patriotism in the military. (McFate, 2019; Council of the European Union Analysis and Research Team, 2023).

In conclusion, the presence of PMCs in international security issues is multifaceted and complex. For the international organizations, here are many advantages to using private contractors as a peacekeeping force, but the private companies hired by private clients or states could possibly put their private interests as a priority and use their expertise as leverage. It is ambiguous whether the PMCs will play a more important role than the traditionally structured military in the future of geopolitics. Could they provide for the solutions of international or non-international conflicts, be a tool for developed states to continue practicing their political influence across world conflicts or they could function as a non- state actor that has active interests in their continuation?

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The post Privatizing War and Peace: The Private Military Contractors Beyond Prigozhin first appeared on IR 101.

Azerbaijan initiated a significant military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh on September 19th, with the goal of defeating the Republic of Artsakh, which has an Armenian-majority population and is self-governed from Stepanakert. Their objective was to establish complete control over the entire Nagorno-Karabakh region. Following months of blockading the Lachin Corridor, which serves as a crucial supply route to Artsakh, Azerbaijan executed a brief military campaign that achieved remarkable success in serving its goal.

The disbandment of the Artsakh Defense Army, coupled with concerns about the possibility of ethnic cleansing and genocide, led to the mass exodus of tens of thousands of ethnic Armenians from Artsakh. Following the rapid military offensive by Azerbaijan, almost 90 percent of the area’s ethnic Armenian residents have fled due to concerns about the conquering military. Azerbaijan’s rapid success in this conflict represents a significant achievement for Turkey’s interests in the South Caucasus region. However, it also presents strategic complexities for Iran and ethical dilemmas for Western nations.

Turkey, the big winner: Turkey and Azerbaijan share strong economic, military, cultural, and linguistic bonds, with President Erdogan frequently expressing the notion that these nations are “one nation, two states.” Conversely, Turkey’s historical relationship with Armenia has been marked by tensions, notably regarding the fact that Armenia categorizes the deaths and prosecutions of around 1.5 million Armenians during the late Ottoman period as a genocide, a label that Turkey vehemently denies.

Analysts assert that Turkey’s unwavering support for Azerbaijan in the recent conflict has played a central role in this significant regional escalation, shedding light on Ankara’s broader aspirations in the area. While Turkey has expressed interest in de-escalating tensions in the South Caucasus, it consistently echoed Azerbaijan’s claims of Armenian obstructionism. When border clashes erupted in September 2022, Turkey criticized Armenia’s “aggressive posture” and accused it of undermining the 2020 ceasefire agreement.

During Azerbaijan’s recent offensive, Turkey expressed similar sentiments. On September 19th, President Erdogan addressed the United Nations General Assembly, affirming, “We endorse Azerbaijan’s actions – guided by the principle of one nation, two states – to safeguard its territorial integrity.” Over the past decade, military cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan has significantly intensified, with the oil and gas-rich nation making substantial investments to achieve military superiority over its economically disadvantaged neighbor, Armenia. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has steadfastly supported Azerbaijan’s military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnically Armenian breakaway region. Turkey provided Baku with combat drones and other military equipment that contributed to Baku’s success in taking parts of the breakaway region during a brief but intense conflict three years ago.

These actions align with Turkey’s significant interests in the South Caucasus, including increasing its influence, securing energy resources, promoting economic opportunities, preserving cultural ties, and maintaining regional alliances. For Ankara, the South Caucasus serves as a link to Central Asia. In its current foreign policy approach, Turkey considers the South Caucasus and Central Asia as closely interrelated, if not inseparable, regions. Both areas are seen as integral components of the “Turkic World,” a concept that, in Ankara’s perspective, historically extended “from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China.” These interests are part of Turkey’s broader foreign policy objectives in the region, aiming to play a more active role in shaping the future of the South Caucasus.

More specifically, While Baku can rely on Ankara to enhance its military capabilities, Ankara views Baku as an essential gateway to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Azerbaijan plays a pivotal role in establishing Turkey’s strategic connections to the South Caucasus, leading to several significant cooperative projects. These include the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, and the Southern Gas Corridor, which encompasses the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE), Trans-Anatolian (TANAP), and Trans-Adriatic (TAP) natural gas pipelines. Additionally, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia annually conduct joint military exercises. Lastly, Turkey strongly supports Azerbaijan’s efforts to establish the Zangezur Corridor, a project that Erdogan believes will strengthen cultural and economic connections within the “Turkish World.” This transit route would provide Azerbaijan with unrestricted access to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, an Azerbaijani territory isolated from the rest of the country by Armenia’s Syunik province, and establish a connection between Azerbaijan and eastern Turkey. This initiative has the potential to expedite the growth of bilateral trade between Turkey and Azerbaijan, aiming to raise it from the current $6 billion to their near-term goal of $15 billion

Therefore, Erdogan recognizes strategic opportunities arising from Nagorno-Karabakh’s integration into Azerbaijan.

Iran’s concerns and ambitions in the region:  Historically, Iran has cultural and geopolitical connections with the South Caucasus, particularly Armenia and Azerbaijan. Iran initially supported Armenia to counterbalance Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the West during the First Karabakh War. However, Iran shifted its stance in favor of Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh War, aligning with the presumed winner to secure post-war advantages.

Despite this shift, Iran’s post-war expectations for economic projects and security assurances were not fully met. Iran sought inclusion in post-war economic initiatives and wanted assurances against potential threats from Israel, which had gained influence in the South Caucasus by supporting Azerbaijan militarily.

In the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, Iran’s interactions with Turkey in the South Caucasus have shifted, eroding Iran’s influence relative to its historical rival. Russia-mediated post-war agreements between Baku and Yerevan have moved away from the previously dominant Russian regional order, paving the way for a more multi-polar landscape where Turkey and Azerbaijan play a pivotal role. This challenges Iran’s long-standing status quo.

More precisely, Azerbaijan’s recent recapture of the remaining Karabakh territory on September 19, 2023, has increased the chances of a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which aligns with Turkey’s interests and may limit Russia’s influence in the region. However, this potential shift toward “less Russia and more Turkey” raises concerns in Tehran about Ankara’s growing role.

Iran is particularly concerned about a clause in the November 2020 Moscow-brokered ceasefire, which mandates the reconstruction of a road and rail link connecting Turkey to mainland Azerbaijan through Nakhchivan and Armenia’s Syunik province as this could marginalize Iran. Tehran is also closely monitoring the deepening ties between Turkey’s ally, Azerbaijan, and its adversary, Israel.

An absent West: As the Turkey-Iran rivalry evolves within the shifting geopolitics of the South Caucasus, the European Union was carefully maintaining a balanced approach in its dealings with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Despite multiple warnings and assurances from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev that a military operation would not be launched, the West was caught off guard by Azerbaijan’s swift and brutal offensive. The humanitarian crisis that has unfolded in the aftermath of the conflict, with hundreds of thousands of people displaced and reports of human rights abuses, underscores the urgent need for a more proactive and assertive Western stance to prevent such tragedies in the future and ensure accountability for those responsible. The West must reevaluate its engagement with Azerbaijan, prioritizing human rights, peace, and stability over short-term economic interests. As for now, next year, Nagorno-Karabakh will no longer be in existence, and we have taken little, if no, action to avert this outcome.

The post Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Turkey’s Influence, Iran’s Concerns, and Western Inaction first appeared on IR 101.

Introduction

After more than a year of deliberation, the UK government has moved forward with the passage of the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill. This legislation is aimed at shifting the approach of achieving a sustainable peace in Northern Ireland. From the 1960s through the early 2000s, Northern Ireland witnessed one of the most violent sectarian conflicts in modern European history, during a period dubbed ‘the troubles’. In its current draft, the bill aims to change the peace process from one of retributive justice to one of restorative justice, through the process of truth and reconciliation. Accordingly, the legislation includes amendments aimed at granting amnesty for those guilty of murder during the troubles, in exchange for cooperation with the newly established Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery (ICRIR), which will be set up following the Bill’s royal assent [1]. The legislation has been met with staunch opposition both from victim’s families in Northern Ireland, as well as from the international community. The Republic of Ireland has promised launch legal challenges, and many support groups for victims of the troubles have criticized the bill. [2]. Truth and reconciliation councils have proved effective in peace processes elsewhere in the world. However, it is necessary to explore if this type of peace process is effective in this context, and what the passage of the legislation will mean for the UK’s international image.

The Atrocities of the Troubles

 Though the origins of the troubles stretch back centuries, the period of violence encapsulated by the term began in the late 1960s. Civil rights groups representing the predominately catholic nationalist minority in Northern Ireland began demonstrations aimed at securing greater rights and freedom from discrimination. These demonstrations were met with backlash from the protestant, unionist majority in Northern Ireland, which feared a descent into republicanism and eventual Irish reunification. The early period of the troubles witnessed nationalist and unionist mobs riot and clash with one another as well as with the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which was routinely accused of both inaction and the use of excessive force in dispelling the riots [3].

The violence escalated dramatically, as nationalists and unionists formed paramilitary organizations and participated in ever escalating bombing and gunfire attacks on both one another as well as civilians on both sides. In 1969, the British government deployed the military to Northern Ireland in the hopes of keeping unionist and nationalist communities separate. While initially welcomed by both sides as a peacekeeping force, the conduct of British forces during the troubles, such as raids on private houses and internment without trial, soon soured their image among the public and served to further the violence by stoking tensions [4]. British military involvement in the troubles witnessed it’s most notorious event during the Bloody Sunday incident, where British soldiers opened fire on peaceful protestors in Londonderry, killing fourteen [5]. Atrocities were not only committed by government forces but also by paramilitary groups throughout the conflict. The Ulster Volunteer Force, a unionist militia formed to combat the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), is alleged to have killed over 500 civilians during the troubles [6]. The PIRA for its part was also responsible for a number of atrocities against civilians, including the infamous Kingsmill massacre, in which 10 protestant civilians were removed from a bus and systematically executed by the PIRA, with those responsible never being apprehended [7]. Indeed, nationalist paramilitaries have been accused of being responsible for as many as 60% of all deaths recorded in the troubles period [8].

Despite the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 and subsequent withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland in 2007, the process of healing in Northern Ireland has been fraught with difficulty. The violence enacted throughout the conflict came from all sides and was often indiscriminate in nature. As a result, many atrocities have gone unpunished and many families have yet to receive justice for their loved ones killed in the conflict.

Reconciliation in the context of Northern Ireland

 The bill proposed by the UK government will empower the ICRIR to collect information on the atrocities committed during the troubles in exchange for amnesty from prosecution. The stated goal of this process is to provide information to families, victims and survivors of troubles related violence in order to promote reconciliation within Northern Ireland [9]. Such processes have seen success elsewhere internationally. In South Africa following the fall of the apartheid regime, a truth and reconciliation commission was launched to expose the crimes committed under the previous government. This ensured that South African society could collectively heal and move forward, without devolving into retributive justice. Canada has also implemented a similar process, promoting truth and reconciliation with first nations peoples of Canada regarding crimes committed within the Canadian residential school system. However, both Canada and South Africa enjoyed at least majority public support for their truth and reconciliation commissions. As noted previously, many victim support groups in Northern Ireland, the Irish Government and EU, have been vocal critics of the Bill, arguing it does not do enough for victims of the conflict.

One case study which policy makers may wish to look to is Sierra Leone. Following the end of their civil war 2002, the international community in cooperation with Sierra Leone, established a hybrid system. This system saw the worst offenders in the conflict prosecuted criminally, while the vast majority of participants of the conflict engaged in a truth and reconciliation process. While this did result in the successful prosecution of many of the conflict’s most egregious offenders, the truth and reconciliation commission failed to gain significant traction. Local support for the commission was low, as it was seen as a foreign imposition by the international community. While beneficial in creating an accurate image of the conflict, the commission did little to address the material needs of those brutalized in the conflict [10]. Given the strong public opposition the commission has faced thus far, it may be wise for ICRIR to avoid the same mistakes made during the peace process in Sierra Leone. The strongest way to ensure this is to allow direct participation from the local population in not only the evidence presented before the commission, but also how the commission is structured and conducted. Such an action would arguably prevent the perception of the commission as merely a London ordered directive, but rather of a grassroots approach to peacebuilding.

UK Peacemaker Status and International Reputation

As the legislation looks to begin, barring any successful legal challenge, the UK will begin a new approach to peacemaking in one of Europe’s most significant conflicts. The results will undoubtedly be watched by the global community. The Council of Europe has been a vocal critic of the amnesty clause [11], and with Ireland an EU member state, the legal challenge they hope to launch against the legislation may find a receptive audience within the European community [12]. As such, there is considerable significance for the UK and its reputation as a law-abiding member of the international community, as well as its commitment to justice. This point is especially important, amid allegations that a principal motivation for the legislation is to protect British state forces, such as the British Army and RUC, from prosecution for their misconduct during the troubles [13].

To confront these allegations and ensure that the peace process in Northern Ireland is successful, the UK must ensure that the commission and its proceedings both include victims of the conflict, as well as ensuring their agency over the process. The stated goals of the commission are deeply admirable, as the legacy of the conflict continues to loom over all of Ireland. However, the necessity of truth commissions to possess public support cannot be ignored. As such, the commission must do more to engender support among those who it proclaims to be interesting in healing. The issue of amnesty must be revisited and ideally, should include more input from Northern Irish citizens. The hybrid system operated by Sierra Leone could prove to be one alternative, which may allow for the prosecution of those with the most responsibility for the violence, while allowing the society at large to come to terms with its collective responsibility through a truth commission. How the truth commission peace process will develop going forward should not be determined here, nor in London, but must instead be determined among the communities of Northern Ireland who deserve to have their calls for justice finally answered.

[1] HL Bill 169 Commons Reason, UK Government, (2023).

[2] Greene, Tommy. “justice denied”: Victims’ families slam UK’s Northern Ireland legacy bill, September 8, 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/9/6/justice-denied-victims-families-slam-uks-northern-ireland-legacy-bill.

[3] McGreevy, Ronan. “How the Troubles Began: A Timeline.” The Irish Times, August 15, 2019. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/how-the-troubles-began-a-timeline-1.3987076.

[4] “Civilian Casualties from British Military: The Troubles (Northern Ireland).” AOAV, October 26, 2022. https://aoav.org.uk/2022/civilian-casualties-from-british-military-the-troubles/#:~:text=Over%20the%20course%20of%20the,the%20British%20military%20%5B13%5D.

[5] Feeney, Oisin. “What Actually Happened on Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland.” IrishCentral.com, January 30, 2023. https://www.irishcentral.com/roots/history/bloody-sunday-northern-ireland.

[6] “UVF Has a Long History of Murder.” The Irish News, June 19, 2023. https://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2023/06/19/news/uvf_has_a_long_history_of_murder-3363304/#:~:text=In%20June%201994%2C%20six%20Catholic,month%2Dold%20son%20looked%20on.

[7] McCambridge, Jonathan. “Kingsmill Inquest ‘a Painful and Frustrating Process for Victims’ Families’.” BreakingNews.ie, March 31, 2023. https://www.breakingnews.ie/ireland/kingsmill-inquest-a-painful-and-frustrating-process-for-victims-families-1456328.html.

[8] Roche, Barry. “Academic Says Republicans Responsible for 60% of Troubles Deaths.” The Irish Times, August 11, 2019. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/academic-says-republicans-responsible-for-60-of-troubles-deaths-1.3983227.

[9] “About Us.” Independent Commission for Reconciliation Information Recovery. https://icrir.independent-inquiry.uk/about-us/

[10] Veney, Cassandra R., and Dick Simpson. African democracy and development challenges for post-conflict African nations. Lanham, Md: Lexington, 2012.

[11] “UK Criticised Again by Council of Europe over Troubles Bill.” Irish Legal News, June 8, 2023. https://www.irishlegal.com/articles/uk-criticised-again-by-council-of-europe-over-troubles-bill.

[12] Al Jazeera. “Ireland considers legal action against UK’s Northern Ireland legacy bill”, September 4, 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/4/ireland-considers-legal-action-against-uks-northern-ireland-legacy-bill.

[13] Al Jazeera. “UK’s controversial Northern Ireland “legacy” bill: All you need to know”, September 6, 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/4/uks-controversial-northern-ireland-legacy-bill-all-you-need-to-know.

The post Peace without Prosecution: Analyzing the passage of the UK Trouble’s Bill first appeared on IR 101.

This optimistic argument begins with demographics. With a population that is significantly younger than that of the West and China, it is anticipated to overtake China as the most populated nation in the world this year. The median age in India is 27.6 against a global value of 30.3 years (World Economics, 2021). Furthermore, the middle class is steadily growing. These factors have contributed to a booming consumer market with rising demand for goods and services in sectors such as technology, finance, and healthcare.

Moreover, India’s poverty level is continually decreasing. According to the World Bank (2023), India will experience the strongest annual economic growth this year, averaging 6.9%, continuing a two-decade record of robust economic expansion. Last year, India surpassed the U.K. as the world’s fifth-largest economy and could even tie Germany for fourth place by 2025. Hence, the macroeconomic image is striking. Yet, maintaining this positive macroeconomic image calls for serious microeconomic reforms that strengthen the supply side of the economy. The nation’s infrastructure, which is still deficient in many places, especially in rural areas, is a significant obstacle. A major skills gap exists in India as well, with many employees missing the education and experience required for high-skilled positions in sectors like technology and healthcare.

India, though, has a will to make things better internally. Many new roadways have been constructed or are being designed in past few years. The length of rural roads has expanded and the number of airports has doubled since Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office in 2014. Also, blackouts have significantly decreased in frequency and electricity plant capacity has risen. According to the administration, the number of residences receiving piped water has skyrocketed over the last three years. 

Mr. Modi has also prioritized addressing India’s infamously costly and ineffective business environment by aiding the digitalisation efforts and adding new bankruptcy legislation. Meanwhile, India developed a vibrant start-up culture even before the Modi administration and is now home to start-ups with a market value of $1 billion. Due to the government’s determination to attract foreign direct investments, Indian emissaries have been the favourites of the Davos crowd.

As far as India’s position in the world stage is concerned, India seems to deepen the cooperation with the West especially through Quad summits. The Quad is extremely important for India since it may act as a form of containment towards China. More importantly New Delhi will lead the G-20 presidency by hosting the body’s summit and will also chair the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. But given India’s charge of the G-20, India aims to validate its rising importance and establish its global leadership aspirations. India intends to lead a climate and development agenda that highlights its own environmental credentials and connects the needs of the Global South. Lastly, New Delhi wants to deliver on its pledge of $100 billion annually for developing countries to use for clean energy and climate change adaptation. Generally, India showcases a “multi-alignment” approach to geopolitics regardless of the major powers’ competition.

Having presented the general profile of India Post-Covid, it is safe to assume that India’s rise will depend on how well takes use of its young working population to position itself as a manufacturing power in order to compete with China, whose competitive edge is being eroded by an aging labour force and rising pay levels. Moreover, India needs to continue its infrastructure development process whilst promoting the image of a booming hub for foreign direct investments, especially through the full implementation of the Production Linked Incentive Scheme whose goal is to offer economic stimuli to the investors.

Nonetheless some potential salient sticking points that could challenge the emergence of India as an economic superpower do exist. These could be a prolonged global recession that could cloud India’s export business prospects, given India’s trade dependent economy. Among the risk factors is also the need for skilled human resources that India mostly lacks.

Bibliography

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Chakraborty, C. and Nunnenkamp, P. (2008). Economic Reforms, FDI, and Economic Growth in India: A Sector Level Analysis. World Development, 36(7), pp.1192–1212. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.06.014.

Chatterjee, A. (2020). India as an Emerging Global Power: Challenges and Prospects. [online] Diplomatist. Available at: https://diplomatist.com/2020/08/27/india-as-an-emerging-global-power-challenges-and-prospects/.

Deshpande, D.P.P. (2023). Prospect of India emerging a major economic power in 2047. The Times of India. [online] Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/truth-lies-and-politics/prospect-of-india-emerging-a-major-economic-power-in-2047/ [Accessed 24 Mar. 2023].

Farrer, M. (2022). India is quietly laying claim to economic superpower status. [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/12/india-is-quietly-laying-claim-to-economic-superpower-status.

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Horowitz, J. (2023). India flexes its muscle at Davos as China’s star fades | CNN Business. [online] CNN. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/19/business/india-economy-world-economic-forum-davos/index.html.

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Schultz, K. and Beniwal, V. (2023). The Global Economy Needs a New Powerhouse. India Is Stepping Up. Bloomberg.com. [online] 23 Jan. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-01-23/india-s-1-4-billion-population-could-become-world-economy-s-new-growth-engine#xj4y7vzkg [Accessed 24 Mar. 2023].

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The post A booming India; Towards the Emergence of an Economic Superpower first appeared on IR 101.

In a surprising turn of events, Tayyip Erdogan has emerged as the winner in Turkey’s recent elections, catching many foreign analysts off guard. The Turkish president holds a clear advantage as he heads into the second round of elections with a five-point lead over his opponent, Kemal Kilicdaroglu. This unexpected outcome raises questions about the accuracy of the polls, which had predicted an opposition victory.

Initially, Erdogan claimed to have enough votes for a first-round win but expressed his willingness to accept a runoff. He accused unnamed individuals of attempting to deceive the nation by falsely claiming to be in the lead. On the other hand, Kilicdaroglu embraced the idea of a runoff and confidently declared his victory.

One major factor contributing to this surprising result is the lack of fairness and democratic practices during the elections. According to the state-owned Anadolu news agency, Erdogan received 49.24% of the votes, while Kilicdaroglu obtained 45.06%. However, discrepancies arose between the data released by state media and the Supreme Election Council (YSK), which oversees the election process. The Erdogan regime has control over the entire state apparatus, including the Supreme Election Commission, which created obstacles for the opposition in effectively campaigning. Most media outlets predominantly conveyed messages from the ruling coalition, further limiting the opposition’s reach.

The YSK reports that over 91% of the votes have been counted, but there have been delays in tallying overseas votes due to a higher number of overseas voters and the involvement of multiple parties this year. Kilicdaroglu and another candidate, Sinan Ogan, expressed concerns about the slow pace of vote counting. Kilicdaroglu criticized the blocking of some counts due to repeated objections and called for democracy workers to ensure that every vote is counted. Ogan alleged manipulation of overseas votes but provided no evidence to support the claims.

Additionally, the AKP has established itself as a dominant party with extensive networks of supporters within the country. Many voters rely on state allowances and benefits provided by the regime, making the prospect of losing significant financial support daunting for them. This poses a challenge for the opposition in swaying their votes.

Another reason for Erdogan’s victory lies in inappropriate interventions by foreign media and politicians. Expressing overt support for the opposition in a country where anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism, and Christianophobia sentiments prevail proved to be counterproductive. It is worth noting that Kilicdaroglu belongs to the Alevi religious minority, a group considered “less Turkish” by many conservative religious Muslims.

Despite the AKP’s decreased share of the parliamentary vote, marking its worst reported result in the past two decades, Erdogan remains a powerful force in Turkey’s political landscape. The outcome of the second round of voting will be critical in shaping the country’s future. It will not only determine its leadership but also influence its path concerning secularism, democracy, economic challenges, and international relations with various countries.

The election results carry significant implications for Turkey’s future, with potential effects on its relationship with Russia, the Middle East, and the West. The second round of voting will be closely watched as the candidates strive to secure the necessary support for victory. The outcome will not only impact Turkey but also resonate throughout the international community, affecting global dynamics and regional alliances.

If Erdogan wins the election, prospects for creative thinking and improved relations with the West will be limited. However, his economic challenges and changing parliamentary dynamics may moderate his actions. Relations with the United States and European countries will likely remain transactional and susceptible to crises.

In terms of the United States, the current relationship with Turkey is uninspiring due to issues such as U.S. sanctions, concerns about ties with Russia, and disagreements

References

Turkey election results 2023: what we know so far | Turkey | The Guardian. (n.d.). Retrieved May 15, 2023, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/15/turkey-election-2023-results-live-election-result-polls-what-we-know-so-far

Turkey faces runoff election with Erdogan leading | Reuters. (n.d.). Retrieved May 15, 2023, from https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-votes-pivotal-elections-that-could-end-erdogans-20-year-rule-2023-05-13/

The Turkish Election Could Reset Ankara’s Relations With the West – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (n.d.). Retrieved May 15, 2023, from https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/09/turkish-election-could-reset-ankara-s-relations-with-west-pub-89715

Εκλογές στην Τουρκία: Γιατί νίκησε ο Ερντογάν | Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ. (n.d.). Retrieved May 15, 2023, from https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/562421047/ekloges-stin-toyrkia-giati-nikise-o-erntogan/

Turkish president votes in presidential, parliamentary elections. (n.d.). Retrieved May 15, 2023, from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkish-president-votes-in-presidential-parliamentary-elections/2897010#

The post Turkey’s 2023 Election Results: Erdogan Defies Poll Predictions, Runoff Looms first appeared on IR 101.

ChatGPT stands out among existing artificial intelligence (AI) systems due to its user-friendly interface, enabling widespread engagement with AI technology.

When it comes to diplomacy, AI systems can swiftly search and summarize information, enabling diplomats to be better prepared for negotiations. As different parties develop their own AI systems, they can compare their findings and employ AI “hagglebots” to identify optimal agreements based on trade-offs and interests. Looking ahead, more advanced AI systems might even attain artificial general intelligence, potentially altering the role of AI in international engagements. Lastly, during negotiations, AI can provide real-time, data-driven advice to delegations.

However, ChatGPT’s lack of transparency introduces difficulties. The sources of its information and data remain undisclosed, potentially leading to biased or inaccurate responses. Concerns have been raised about ChatGPT generating fabricated information, eroding trust in diplomatic institutions and hindering global cooperation in an increasingly interconnected world.

While the broader impact of AI has been previously discussed, such as its use by students for essay writing or lawmakers for legislation, the influence of ChatGPT on diplomacy has received limited attention. Although it can automate consular services and assist diplomats in negotiations, a significant challenge arises: the growing reliance on AI systems to interpret the world.

This challenge stems from ChatGPT’s potential biases and its tendency to produce misleading or false information. Users may turn to ChatGPT as a real-time source of knowledge about events, countries, and entities, leading to the creation of alternative realities. As the gap widens between reality and ChatGPT-generated realities, individuals may struggle to comprehend the world, fostering uncertainty, alienation, and political polarization. Populist leaders capitalize on these sentiments by promising a return to a simpler, more coherent world. They undermine diplomacy by criticizing globalization, multilateral institutions, and global problem-solving approaches.

Although diplomats have embraced digital technologies, the emergence of ChatGPT presents a unique and unfamiliar digital challenge. By harnessing its potential benefits and navigating its pitfalls, diplomats can leverage AI for more efficient diplomatic work. However, precautions must be taken to ensure the accuracy and reliability of information, combat disinformation, and avoid perpetuating stereotypes or undermining diplomatic efforts. Urgency lies in finding ways to experiment, identify risks, and collaborate with AI companies to mitigate them.

References:

Manor, I. (2023). Opinion – ChatGPT and the Threat to Diplomacy. https://www.e-ir.info/2023/04/07/opinion-chatgpt-and-the-threat-to-diplomacy/

Manor, I. (2023). The AI Moves In: ChatGPT’s Impact on Digital Diplomacy | USC Center on Public Diplomacy. https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/ai-moves-chatgpt%E2%80%99s-impact-digital-diplomacy

Moore, A. (2023). From ChatGPT to Quantum Computing, New Tech Could Reshape Diplomacy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/21/ai-artificial-intelligence-diplomacy-negotiations-chatgpt-quantum-computing/

The post Chat GPT and Diplomacy: Navigating the Challenges of an AI-Powered Information Gatekeeper first appeared on IR 101.

Among the most startling trends noted by international relations scholars is the increased impartiality of the global south on many of the direst geopolitical issues facing the world today. The reasons for the increase in states adopting a neutral position are complex and should not be reduced to simplistic explanations. However, one interesting variable which partially explains the emergence of this trend is the prevalence of vaccine diplomacy throughout the covid-19 pandemic. Though considerably less effective than their western counterparts, vaccines produced by countries such as China, Russia, and India, offered global south countries in desperately needed access to vaccines to combat the pandemic. This charitable initiatives are seen in contrast to global north countries, whom the global south community accused of hoarding vaccines and not doing enough to stop the pandemic. As a result, there has been a notable increase in warmer relations between these perceived altruistic countries and states which struggled to combat the pandemic. Moreover, this vaccine diplomacy has come in tandem with waves of vaccine misinformation, which sought to undermine western vaccines as a means by which to promote alternative non-western vaccines. As such, it is important now in a post-pandemic context to chart the development of vaccine diplomacy, make note of its impacts, and derive policy suggestions for states going forward.

Vaccines as soft power tools

In January of 2021, the WHO began to raise considerable concern over the global inequality surrounding access to vaccines, with officials proclaiming that the world was on the brink of a moral failure. By early 2022, these predictions had proved to be prophetic, as many countries especially in Africa, lacked robust vaccines programs while western countries were preparing to roll out booster programs (Sparke, Levy, 2022). It was within this context that states such as China, Russia and India began to offer vaccines to global south states in an effort to help them turn the tide against covid. The amount and significance of these donations varied depending on how a state weathered its own pandemic as well as the international policies it implemented regarding vaccine distributions. India for example enjoyed a strong start to its initial campaign of vaccine diplomacy. However, this trend quickly backfired during the country’s second wave as it found itself inadequately prepared for the momentous task of vaccinating large numbers of its own citizens (Chikodzi, Nhamo, 2023). Similarly, Russia found itself in a strong position initially, having donated medical equipment earlier in the pandemic globally and developing the worlds first marketed vaccine in Sputnik V. However, credibility issues regarding the vaccine as well as the war in Ukraine harmed the image of the Russian vaccine abroad, leading to a decline in its soft power potential (Giusti, Ambrosetti, 2023). China conversely enjoyed a relatively well received vaccine internationally being widely adopted by countries across Asia, Latin America, and Africa. However, it failed to break through many thresholds necessary for massive adoption. In the Middle East and Mediterranean for example, China was able to export its vaccine to many regional states such as Egypt and Lebanon. However, China proved unable to break into Turkey, a key regional player and NATO member, demonstrating the persisting limits to its soft power (Üngör, 2023).

It is important to note these drawbacks so as to not give in to the wave of sensationalism which has followed reports of vaccine diplomacy. Western powers still hold a significant advantage within both medical technology capacity, as well as legitimacy. However, it is important to note that the perceived reluctance of western powers to be forthcoming with vaccine donations precipitated shifts within the international order which, while not yet seismic, do signify the beginning of a worrying trend which merits the attention of scholars and policymakers alike. The necessity of tackling the pandemic coupled with the difficulty of expanding procurement drove India into deeper cooperation with Russia in order to satisfy its domestic demand, strengthening an already worrying bilateral relationship between the two countries. Additionally, the severity of India’s second wave prompted China to offer vaccine donations, which although unlikely to represent a turn in relations, signifies a marked departure from the traditionally distant and unfriendly relations between the two countries (Chikodzi, Nhamo, 2023). Russia also utilized the prospect of extrapolating backdoors as a result of the pandemic. Russian donations of vaccines to economically weaker regions of Europe helped to worsen social cleavages regarding support for Ukraine during Russia’s invasion, a result which represents a small yet significant diplomatic victory for Moscow (Giusti, Ambrosetti, 2023). Above all however, China enjoyed the widest success with their vaccine diplomacy campaign. China relied on its well-established policies of bilateralism throughout the pandemic, creating ‘win-win’ scenarios for itself and recipient countries. The extent of this diplomacy even reached Europe, where countries such as Serbia, Montenegro and even EU member states like Hungary and Czechia utilized Chinese vaccines despite not being approved by the European Medicines Agency (Lee, 2021). The value of these connections also expands to the geopolitical realm. Honduras, a country which received Chinese vaccines, recently moved to cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan after decades of amicable relations between the two countries, a move no doubt motivated by the political favour earned by Beijing throughout the pandemic.

While vaccine diplomacy efforts were brought about tangibly through the physical deliveries of vaccines, the initiatives were bolstered in large part through misinformation campaigns. These efforts sought to cast western developed vaccines as dangerous not through outright disinformation but rather by amplifying reports of their danger in attempts to mislead media consumers on their efficiency and safety. Researchers have also noted that these narratives, and the contrast between “dangerous” western vaccines and “efficient” alternatives formed the backbone of how countries like China and Russia pitched their vaccine programs to developing countries (Schafer, 2021). Evidence of this commitment to misinformation can also be seen in Russia Today’s coverage of the Ottawa Trucker Protest in Canada’s capital last year, where the Kremlin sponsored media outlet covered the protest disproportionately more than other outlets, while also adopting a largely pro-trucker stance, indicating potential Russian involvement in the movement (Bueno, 2022).

Policy implications regarding vaccine diplomacy

Given the emergence of this alarming trend, western policymakers should ensure that the issues surrounding medical diplomacy are addressed as soon as possible. As the world increasingly recovers from the covid-19 pandemic, experts continue to warn that future pandemics are on the horizon which could threaten comparable if not equal disruptions to the international order. Moreover, given that the effects of vaccine diplomacy are still being felt by the international order, the issue is not merely one which has receded alongside the pandemic but rather one which will likely endure if not worsen. As such it is important for effective international policy to be crafted and international relations scholarship to become more nuance in order to bring increased transparency to these trends.

As stated earlier, it is essential for the west to realize that while vaccine diplomacy initiatives represent a powerful tool wielded by adversarial states, by no means has the west fallen dramatically behind within its legitimacy. This should drive western institutions and governments to further emphasize the reliability of their medical capacity through increased outreach with the global south. This outreach could manifest itself in a multitude of ways, but an important one being collaborations with global south medical institutions and actors. Such actions could further improve trust between global south and western actors, resulting in increased transparency, thereby enhancing sense of integrity afforded to western institutions and potentially an increased willingness to cooperate on public health crises such as Covid-19. Such cooperation may also impart the necessary technical expertise required to increase the vaccine production capacity within the global south, thereby limiting the dependence of global south actors on.

Additionally, policymakers should look at ways to increase the access of vaccine knowledge to global south countries. Intellectual property rights proved to be an immense obstacle for global south access to vaccines over the course of the pandemic, arguably prolonging and worsening the global impact of the virus (Altindis, 2022). As such, while western countries should insure to safeguard the intellectual property of their national firms, pragmatism must take pre-eminence when considering how to combat future pandemics whilst retaining stable international standing. Considerable effort must be committed to bridging the gap between intellectual property and the practical ability of the global south to access vaccines.

Lastly, western institutions must endeavour to combat the spread of disinformation regarding western institutions and vaccinations. Delegitimizing western vaccines formed an important component of how states such as Russia and China pursued their campaigns of vaccine diplomacy. As such, efforts to increase trust within global south actors should encompass efforts to dispel falsehoods and half-truths pertaining to western vaccines. Doing so will not only allow for enhanced trust between the global north and the global south but will also contribute to a significantly safer global south who are adequately informed of the benefits of vaccinations and risks posed by viral infections.

Conclusion

 Vaccine diplomacy, while existent prior to, has been significantly amplified as a result of the covid-19 pandemic, and will likely continue to be an important soft power tool in coming years. Western states significantly lagged behind non-western states in their vaccine diplomacy programs, allowing states such as China and Russia to establish important diplomatic relationships stemming from their donations of desperately needed vaccines. As such, this paper recommends that western states and institutions should acknowledge the political power of these programs and endeavor to address their effects. Western governments should therefore seek to increase the global south’s access to vaccines as well as combatting the disinformation promoted by adversarial states. Implement these policy actions will in large part determine not only the medical but also the political implications of future pandemics.

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Chikodzi, D. and Nhamo, G. (2023) “Covid-19 Vaccine Diplomacy: Tracking the Chinese, Indian and Russian Global Pathways and Undertones,” in The COVID-19 – Health Systems Nexus: Emerging trends, issues and dynamics in Zimbabwe. Cham: Springer International Publishing AG, pp. 277–290.

Giusti, S. and Ambrosetti, E.T. (2023) “Health and Vaccine Diplomacy in Russia’s Foreign Policy,” in Political economy of global responses to covid-19. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, pp. 207–225.

Lee, S.T. (2021) “Vaccine diplomacy: Nation branding and China’s COVID-19 soft power play,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 19(1), pp. 64–78. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-021-00224-4.

Orr Bueno, C. (2023) “Russia’s role in the far-right truck convoy,” The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare, 5(3), pp. 1–22. Available at: https://doi.org/10.21810/jicw.v5i3.5101.

Schafer, B. (2021) Influence-enza: How Russia, China, and Iran have shaped and manipulated coronavirus vaccine narratives, Alliance For Securing Democracy. Available at: https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/russia-china-iran-covid-vaccine-disinformation/ (Accessed: April 22, 2023).

Sparke, M. and Levy, O. (2022) “Competing responses to global inequalities in access to COVID vaccines: Vaccine diplomacy and vaccine charity versus Vaccine Liberty,” Clinical Infectious Diseases, 75(Supplement_1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/ciac361.

Üngör, Ç. (2023) “Chinese vaccine diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Continuities and rupture in Beijing’s soft power prospects,” Contemporary Review of the Middle East, 10(1), pp. 62–83. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/23477989221143276.

The post Vaccine diplomacy and selfish altruism: assessing the impacts of medical diplomacy on soft power prospects first appeared on IR 101.

Last month, a first of its kind conference in the Netherlands sought to bring together a collection of states with the goal of promoting increased responsibility regarding the implementation and use of artificial intelligence within the global defence sector. The conclusion of the summit witnessed many major military powers, including the US and China, sign a non-binding agreement calling for increased caution and responsibility regarding military AI. Such an agreement reflects a justified concern for the rate which AI is increasingly being adopted by governments across the world to supplement their military capabilities. However, such a trend also necessitates nuance. AI is proving to be an exponentially powerful tool, especially within weapons systems and cyber warfare capabilities. In light of this emerging trend, the international community has an obligation to attempt to guide the development and promote the restraint of the military applicable AI. Such an outcome may be difficult to achieve, but the implications of inaction are frighteningly dire.

AI’s role within militaries

The role of artificial intelligence within militaries has been on an exponential increase in recent decades, in part owing to its immensely beneficial potential and also due to is popularity, necessitating nations to remain competitive. Many of uses of artificial intelligence are not as nefarious as one might conceive when thinking of military applications for technologies. Logistics are one crucial area where AI can be used to augment military performance, while posing relatively little cause for concern ethically. As the complexity of war increases, so too do the demands on military logistics branches and their supply chains (Rudas, Liu, 2021). Artificial intelligence may also prove to be immensely beneficial in its capacity to provide suggestive analysis to military leadership. Another by product of the aforementioned complexity of war is a dramatic increase in the variables at play on a modern battlefield. AI may therefore allow for a greater increase in the ability to process information and provide suggested solutions to commanders and strategists.

Such a result may prove to be ethically beneficial, as the AI in question could suggest avenues which promote quicker resolutions to conflicts at less cost to human life. Conversely, the opposite is equally possible, as artificial intelligence has the potential to promote an escalation of conflicts, as decision making loses it’s human intuition and reverts to cold calculations to deliver solutions to conflicts. In this same vein of thinking, the emergence of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, or LAWS, has also greatly problematized AI military applicability. These weapons systems are designed to distinguish targets and engage targets independently of human intervention. Such systems, once thought to be in the realm of science fiction, are now increasing their prominence within militaries. The Chinese Air Force has been expanding the ability of AI to engage in dogfights through having fighter pilots train against AI, with the AI’s demonstrating a profound potential to learn from and implement tactics observed in its human opponents (Pickrell). Even more worryingly, in 2021 the US Air Force implemented AI into a kill chain, asking it to identify a target before lethal forced was used. The Air Force applauded the success of the implementation, arguing it allowed for a more concise process between identification and engagement (Miller, 2021). While the AI in this instance did not engage in lethal action directly, the desire to streamline the process of identification and engagement could reasonably result in an increased trust placed in the discretion of AI systems to utilize lethal force. Such a reality carries with it grave moral implications which necessitate an involvement from the international community.

The Necessity of Restraint and the Nuclear Precedent

The conference in the Netherlands reflects the aforementioned need for involvement in regulation of AI for military uses. However beneficial the conference may have been, more is certainly needed going forward in light of the destructive potential of these systems. Emerging literature in academia is advocating for regulation of military AI. Bérénice Boutin proposes that states should be held accountable before international law both for violations of international law owing to the deployment of military AI systems, as well as for failing to properly mandate legally binding limitations of the capacity of military AI. Regarding the development of AI systems among transnational corporations, Boutin believes these organizations are equally liable for responsible conduct of their technologies. Where state governments feel they are unable to regulate, international bodies such as the United Nations and European Union must intervene on behalf of the public interest (Boutin, 2022).

Many may scoff at the prospect of international regulation of these weapon systems, as the international community has notably fallen short on creating effective legislation regarding equally dire crises such as climate change. However, climate change may not be the only precedent to look to for confidence in international regulation. Nuclear weapons stand as one notable example where international regulation, discourse, and diplomacy, played an instrumental role for ensuring the security of all mankind. The Non-proliferation treaty, entering into force in the 1970s, was highly effective at the prevention of dozens of states obtaining nuclear weapons. The treaty created a respected international norm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and states which broke the norm to pursue nuclear programs such as North Korea became international pariah states (Abe, 2020). The 2015 Iran Nuclear deal stands as another example of an effective arms control treaty, with Iran voluntarily meeting its nuclear commitments prior to the Trump administrations’ withdrawal of the deal in 2018 (Robinson, 2022). However, drafting such treaties and fostering the international support necessary to respect them will take time, time which may not be in abundance with such a rapidly expanding sector. Should military AI expand to dangerous levels prior to prohibitions on its proliferation being established, policymakers could potentially look to the START treaties for inspiration. These treaties oversaw the voluntary reduction of nuclear capacity between the US and Russia, with both countries meeting their targets and significantly reducing the nuclear threat they posed to one another and the world at large. While Russia has recently withdrawn from the treaty as a reaction to western sanctions regarding to the Ukraine war, the hitherto success of the treaties demonstrates that diplomacy still remains as a an option for disarmament.

Conclusion

 The integration of AI into military technology is a foregone conclusion, as the process has already begun in earnest. Across the world, some of the most highly advanced militaries have begun to use AI to augment their forces and improve their proficiency. Not all of these initiatives are ethnically problematic, as logistical, and strategizing functions for AI may prove to save both human labour and human lives. However, a moralistic and human aspect must be kept at the forefront of military ethics, something AI seems ill prepared to accommodate. In light of this shortfall, the international community must be willing to step in, and hold delinquent actors and state accountable for the proliferation and irresponsible use of lethal AI. The international community demonstrated that diplomacy was able to keep the peace regarding nuclear weapons, and there should be an equally strong effort to impose similar controls over military AI owing to their destructive capacity. While such an effort will require dedication and resources to bring to fruition, the international community has succeeded before and can succeed again in mitigating the worst destructive tendencies among them.

Bibliography

Abe, N. (2020) “The NPT at Fifty: Successes and failures,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 3(2), pp. 224–233. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2020.1824500.

Bistron, M. and Piotrowski, Z. (2021) “Artificial intelligence applications in military systems and their influence on sense of security of citizens,” Electronics, 10(7), p. 871. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10070871.

Boutin, B. (2022) “State responsibility in relation to military applications of Artificial Intelligence,” Leiden Journal of International Law, 36(1), pp. 133–150. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0922156522000607.

Miller, A. (2021) AI algorithms deployed in kill chain target recognition, Air & Space Forces Magazine. Available at: https://www.airandspaceforces.com/ai-algorithms-deployed-in-kill-chain-target-recognition/#:~:text=Kendall%20said%20that%20in%202021,%E2%80%9Cfor%20automated%20target%20recognition.%E2%80%9D.

Pickrell, R. (2021) China says its fighter pilots are battling artificial-intelligence aircraft in simulated dogfights, and humans aren’t the only ones learning, Business Insider. Business Insider. Available at: https://www.businessinsider.com/china-pits-fighter-pilots-against-ai-aircraft-in-simulated-dogfights-2021-6.

Robinson, K. (2022) What is the Iran Nuclear Deal? Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal.

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Over the past year, many governments have faced difficult decisions due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Germany, for example, has broken a long-standing taboo in its foreign and defense policy by offering military support to Ukraine, while Finland and Sweden have requested NATO membership.

Being located in the heart of Europe and surrounded by EU member states, Switzerland has no doubt about the identity of the aggressor and victim in the Ukraine conflict. Switzerland’s response to Russia’s aggression has been clear-cut, with the country aligning itself with EU sanctions against Russia on February 28th and consistently voting against Russia in the UN General Assembly. However, the conflict has tested the country’s traditional neutrality, which has long been a cornerstone of its foreign policy.
The concept of Swiss neutrality, which has been held for centuries, may be difficult for outsiders to fully comprehend. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Switzerland was granted “eternal neutrality” which is also legally upheld by the Hague Convention of 1907. This was a pragmatic and geopolitical decision that was supported because the country was viewed as a harmless buffer between the major powers of Europe, with France on one side and Austria and Prussia on the other. By granting Switzerland neutrality, its safety was preserved while neighboring countries engaged in conflicts and wars. This decision was seen to maintain stability in the region and protect Switzerland from being drawn into conflicts between its more powerful neighbors.

As a result, Switzerland has adhered to its tradition of neutrality by refraining from sending weapons to any combatants involved in a conflict, either directly or indirectly while it also maintains an embargo on arms sales to both Ukraine and Russia. Therefore, when Germany asked Switzerland to allow the export of Swiss-manufactured ammunition for tanks destined for Kyiv, the Swiss government refused. Additionally, the government recently declined a Spanish request to transfer two Swiss-made anti-aircraft guns from Madrid’s arsenal to Kyiv. Similarly, Bern had previously denied requests from Denmark and Germany to supply Swiss-made anti-aircraft ammunition to the Ukrainian military.

There are two conflicting viewpoints in the debate about Switzerland’s neutrality. One view is based on customary law and argues that Switzerland should treat all parties equally, while the other view which holds that the United Nations Charter should be considered and that the aggressor and the victim should not be treated equally. However, this issue is controversial, and the debate on re-export permits has further fueled the controversy.

According to a recent poll published by Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 55% of the Swiss population would support the delivery of weapons purchased from Switzerland by a third party. The public and political shift in Switzerland towards supporting Ukraine has put pressure on the government to end a ban on exports of Swiss weapons to war zones, which would break with centuries of tradition as a neutral state. However, there is a legal restriction preventing buyers of Swiss arms from re-exporting them, and some argue that this restriction is now negatively impacting the country’s large weapons industry.

Lawmakers in Switzerland are reconsidering their country’s neutrality in light of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, although any potential changes may come too late to aid Kyiv as it prepares for a potential Russian offensive in the spring. While Germany and other allies have pledged to provide military support to Ukraine, Swiss politicians have been exploring ways to work around their country’s restrictions on re-exporting weapons. The urgency of the situation has spurred them to consider multiple ideas. However, any adjustment to it must be decided by the Swiss in accordance with relevant regulations.

Ultimately, the choice is between upholding traditional neutrality or showing solidarity with Ukraine. Whichever decision is made, it will be a defining moment for Switzerland’s future position.

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